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Abstract
This paper aims to explore the possible contribution of evolutionary economics to environmental
policy-making, in particular with respect to innovations in energy technology. Evolutionary
economics offers insights into the mechanisms that underlie innovations, structural changes and
transitions, therefore making it of great value in framing policies aimed at stimulating environmental
innovations and transitions to sustainable development. The paper identifies ‘bounded rationality’,
‘diversity’, ‘innovation’, ‘selection’, ‘path dependency and lock-in’, and ‘co-evolution’ as the main
concepts in evolutionary economics. These concepts are subsequently used to formulate guidelines
for designing energy innovation policies. We evaluate current Dutch policies related to energy
technologies against this background and examine the development of three particular energy
technologies within the adopted evolutionary economics framework, namely fuel cells, nuclear fusion,
and photovoltaic cells. We conclude that in order to incorporate the core concepts of evolutionary
economics, governmental technology policies should focus more on the diversity of technologies,
strategies and businesses, rather than on economic efficiency as the key goal. It is further found that
evolutionary concepts conflicting with traditional growth objectives are rarely incorporated in Dutch
energy innovation policies.
Keywords: Evolutionary economics, energy, environmental policy, innovation policy, sustainability,
transition management
1. Introduction
Evolutionary economics was hinted at as early as 1898 in the question posed by Veblen
(1898): ‘‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’’. Some decades later, Schumpeter
and the Austrian school laid a fertile basis for the development of economics as an
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evolutionary science, notably by focusing on innovations. Schumpeter introduced
the concepts of ‘entrepreneur’ and ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter 1934, 1939, 1942),
which came to have enormous influence in later economic policy-making. Evolutionary
economics gained full momentum from the 1970s onwards, when Nelson and Winter (1982)
built their theoretical framework on the evolutionary ideas laid down by Schumpeter. A
number of evolutionary schools have emerged since, such as evolutionary game theory, neo-
Schumpeterian technology analysis and evolutionary multi-agent modelling.
Environmental policy, with its focus on innovations and system change, could greatly
benefit from insights taken from evolutionary economics. One reason why evolutionary
economics is now more relevant to economic and environmental policy theories is the rapid
development of evolutionary economics since the 1970s. As opposed, in Schumpeter’s time
evolutionary thinking—in biology and certainly economics—still lacked a coherent
perspective on microevolution, coevolution, group selection, macroevolution and other
issues relevant to social science.
In this paper, we offer a theoretical evolutionary framework based on six central concepts:
diversity, innovation, selection, bounded rationality, path dependency and lock-in, and co-
evolution (Section 2). The evolutionary framework is applied to assess Dutch energy
innovation policies, for which environmental policy provides an important context (Section 3).
Testing for the presence of evolutionary elements in policy documents allows current energy
innovation policies in The Netherlands to be evaluated from an evolutionary economics
perspective (Section 4). The evolutionary concepts are applied to the technology level, with
three main energy technologies being examined: fuel cells, nuclear fusion and photovoltaic
cells (Section 5). Section 6 draws conclusions and makes a number of policy-relevant
suggestions.
2. The evolutionary economic framework in six basic concepts
2.1. Bounded rationality
Evolutionary economics is increasingly regarded as a useful approach for assessing processes
of structural change, including developments in technology, innovation, organisations,
economic structure and institutions. The evolutionary perspective on economics replaces the
traditional neoclassical assumption of rational and optimising behaviour with the more
realistic assumption of bounded rationality of economic agents. The concept of bounded
rationality implies that agents are not fully informed and will not include all possibilities in
their considerations for performing any behavioural or economic act. Much more often,
agents rely on routines, heuristics and experience. Bounded rationality is largely based on the
idea that gathering full information is constrained by time and energy: it is simply impossible
to collect all this information. Neither is it always useful to make a fully informed economic
decision, since actions based on limited information usually offer a very satisfactory solution.
Thus, a satisfactory outcome is often as good as or better than a perfect one, and it may be
very rational in terms of costs related to achieving that solution (Vermeij 2004). This concept
of bounded rationality may take the form of routines, habits, imitation and a limited horizon
in time and scale.
2.2. Diversity
An important consequence of bounded rationality is heterogeneity in strategies of economic
agents. This heterogeneity based on bounded rationality is contrary to the neoclassical
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economic approach, which usually involves a homogeneous population of economic agents
or strategies based on rational optimalisation. Heterogeneity translates into diversity of
economic strategies, technologies, agents and structure. Diversity is a central concept in the
evolutionary framework, as it is regarded as a measure for the fitness of an economic or
ecological system. Fitness is in itself a measure of survival and reproduction in a system.
Diversity relates to fitness through Fisher’s Theorem: ‘The greater the genetic variability upon
which selection for fitness may act, the greater the expected improvement in fitness’ (Fisher
1930). The concept of diversity can be elaborated with three properties (Stirling 2004):
variety (the number of options in a portfolio), balance (the evenness of representation of the
different options in the portfolio), and disparity (the degree to which the options in the
portfolio are different from one another). All three dimensions will affect the outcomes of
both innovation and selection.1
2.3. Innovation
Over time, system diversity will change as a result of the processes of innovation and selection.
Innovation increases diversity in economic systems, analogous to mutation and re-
combination in ecological systems. An increase in diversity implies an increase in
opportunities for creative combinations contributing to the system’s survival and fitness.
Innovation is often the result of serendipity: an outcome that results from combining insight
and expertise with chance (Fine and Deegan 1996). Knowledge is thus crucial for processes of
innovation, as these often involve re-combinations of existing techniques or concepts.
Systematic search (R&D, science) is a method to increase the chance of useful innovative
combinations.
Future visions and utopias may be useful for enhancing the effectivenes and focus in
searching for profitable innovations. Innovations can be classified in various ways, for
example, by distinguishing products, production and services. A common distinction is
made between radical and incremental innovations. Incremental innovations are in line
with the prevailing technological paradigm and often improve the performance of existing
technologies. Incremental innovations usually reinforce the technological system they align
with. Radical innovations, on the other hand, fall outside the prevailing technological
paradigm and usually involve combinations of very different concepts and technologies.
The 12th century windmill can be seen as a combination of waterwheel milling technology
and sailing technology aimed at the use of wind energy (Mokyr 1990, p. 44). Incremental
innovations are far more common than radical innovations, but the influence of the latter
can be enormous. A certain level of geographical or institutional isolation may be useful
for harbouring radical innovations, that is, to allow for technological niches apart from
the dominant technological regime. Iceland has recently put this notion into practice
by developing a technological niche regime aimed at enhancing the concept of a
hydrogen economy. Even in isolation, it should be noted that innovations are always
developed within an institutional setting or innovation system and almost never in a linear
fashion.
2.4. Selection
Diversity is reduced by processes of selection. Selection refers to the survival and reproduction
of successful agents or strategies in a system. A selection environment involves physical,
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physiological and geographical constraints, and in economic systems also technological,
organisational, economic or institutional dimensions. Selection should not be simplified as
‘survival of the fittest’, but rather as the survival of the sufficiently adapted species in a
changing selection environment. In a natural system, different species choose different
survival strategies. A similar specialisation process applies to economic systems, where agents
adapt their economic activities to the extent to which they can occupy their own niche in the
economic system.
2.5. Path dependency and lock-in
Repeated selection can result in path dependencies. This concept relates to increasing
returns because of scale advantages, ‘learning-by-using’, imitation, network externalities,
information effects (what is sold most is best known and thus sells more) and technical
complementarity (Arthur 1989). Increasing returns are often the result of and lead to
positive feedback mechanisms. This process may end in the dominance of a particular
technological or economic regime and may, in turn, be reinforced by incremental
innovations based on previous innovations within that same regime. The situation where
technologies become dominant due to positive feedback mechanisms is often referred to as
lock-in.
A topical example of a locked-in technology is the Windows operating system. Microsoft
Windows is ubiquitous on PCs worldwide and its dominance is reinforced through positive
feedbacks and network advantages: users without Windows are disabled or limited in
exchanging information with others, as well as in using certain software programs. Although
favourably evaluated alternatives like Linux have existed for some time now, the technological
and market monopoly of Windows remains unchallenged due to its increasing returns to scale
on the demand and supply side.
Processes of path dependency introduce history into economic dynamics, since
technological developments tend to follow irreversible pathways. This is an important
distinction from neoclassical economic theory, which suggests that a system can return to an
optimal configuration, thus often neglecting technologically or institutionally irreversible
developments. It should be noted that lock-in and path dependency make it particularly
difficult to introduce and proliferate technologies outside the dominant technological regime.
Reducing the chances of lock-in requires maintenance of diversity, and more generally, an
extended level playing field (see Section 3).
2.6. Co-evolution
A final core evolutionary concept is co-evolution. This concept refers to the mutual
influence and interference between two or more systems or populations: one system may
exert selection pressure upon another system and vice versa, leading to related
evolutionary developments in both systems. Co-evolution is thus a particular concept of
dynamic interaction between two populations with internal diversity. Norgaard (1984) first
applied the concept of co-evolution to socio-economic systems, introducing feedbacks
between five partial systems of knowledge, values, organisation, technology and
environment. Variations in each of these systems are strongly influenced by the other
systems, and vice versa. An example is the introduction of pesticides, which not only
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triggered higher crop yields, but also an increase in resistance of the pests to the
pesticides. Another example is the co-evolution following the domestication of animals,
which triggered not only large-scale cultural and economic changes in early societies, but
also led to artificial selection of plants and animals (Campbell 1996, p. 569). Later, this
was followed by a co-evolution of human diseases and bacteria and viruses derived from
animals (Diamond 1997).
An example of co-evolution between economic systems is provided by the heavy organic
chemical industry in the United States, which was coal-based in the beginning of the last
century. In the 1920s, the rapid growth in demand for petrol (gas) for automobiles in the
United States led to a large and inexpensive supply of olefins as a by-product in the
refining process. By the end of World War II, the US chemical industry had fully changed
to petroleum-based feedstocks (Ruttan 2002). It is interesting to see that present-day
sustainability policies sometimes refer to a new transition in the chemical sector,
which should be based on biomass feedstocks. It may well be that changes in other
economic systems are required in order to be able to make such changes in the chemical
industry.
3. Evolutionary concepts and environmental policy
The evolutionary economic framework and its concepts give rise to new insights in the
framing of environmental policy, particularly where this policy focuses on innovative solutions
within the existing economic system or on system changes to sustainable development (also
known as ‘transitions’ or ‘industrial restructuring’). The neoclassical economic perspective
on environmental policy theory emphasises the efficiency of regulation, interpreted as
welfare maximisation or cost minimisation. This theory aims to remove market failures that
reduce social welfare, notably those relating to public goods (‘bads’ in the case of
environmental pollution) and negative (environmental) externalities. Evolutionary economic
theory distinguishes fundamentally from general economic theory on several features (see also
Boschma et al. 2002):
. The central focus of evolutionary policy is on economic dynamics resulting from
innovation, selection and accumulation, while general neoclassical economic policy is very
much concerned with static equilibria (however, this does not hold for growth theory as
applied to environmental and resource issues).
. Although evolutionary processes are fundamentally without a goal or target, normative
elements can be added by policy-makers. In neoclassical policy the main goal is maximum
social welfare or minimum cost of regulation.
. In the neoclassical economic theory of policy the governmental role is res-
tricted to removing market failures. Public policy from an evolutionary angle is
more focused on influencing the selection environment and the effectiveness of
innovation.
As a result, ‘evolutionary policy’ will refrain from ‘picking winners’. The reason is that it
can never be known beforehand who will be the winners in terms of economic,
environmental or social benefits, given that the complexity and uncertainty of evolutionary
dynamics are very large. Policy-makers could put evolutionary economics into practise by
creating conditions under which evolutionary processes will lead to socially desirable
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outcomes. An evolutionary-based policy will focus on influencing the conditions of the
selection environment, promote innovative strength, and make advantageous use of
co-evolution. An important element of an evolution-inspired policy is to promote diversity
as a goal in itself. The six concepts we identified in Section 2 can help us to describe an
environmental policy based on evolutionary economic theory.
A starting point for an evolutionary environmental policy lies in the concept of path
dependency. It is of key importance to realise that most developments are decided in their early
phases. Therefore, care is needed to foster new technologies and experiments in the early
phases, although it will still be important to keep an eye on all phases of an innovation or
technology development. This is to maintain sufficient diversity of technologies, from both
the innovation (potential for combinations) and selection (acting upon diversity) perspectives.
Diversity management should focus on stimulating a wide range of technologies and strategies
in terms of variety, disparity and balance. Diversity of technologies and strategies introduces
resilience and robustness in environmental policy, which goes beyond the concepts of
efficiency and unilinear (economic) growth.
Unlocking of existing, undesirable (fossil fuel) technologies requires an ‘extended level
playing field’, where alternative technologies, organisations and institutions can compete with
more dominant elements. A number of conditions need to be met if a credible extended level
playing field is to be realised. First, prices need to reflect all the external costs generated by
activities and products. Second, technologies that are low on the learning curve, but at the
same time may be expected to have large sustainability potential in the long run, need to
receive special support, either by creating niches or by providing subsidies. Exposing such
technologies to free market competition where short-term cost-effectiveness dominates is not
a good strategy in trying to make a transition to long-term sustainability. An early lock-in of
relatively unsustainable technologies should therefore be avoided, as it will go along with an
early decrease of potentially attractive more sustainable technologies. This might take the
form of preventing or compensating (coincidental) increasing returns (see the Box text
for a theoretical example of this due to energy saving). A third condition for an extended
level playing field is to try to expose different technological options to similar selection
mechanisms.
Stimulating unlocking requires in addition that all explicit and implicit stimuli of the
dominant technology are removed, and that preferential treatment (e.g. in public choices and
purchases) be given to desirable alternatives. Unlocking can also be enhanced by setting a
clear, ambitious environmental goal with a time horizon, like the zero-emissions vehicles’
regulatory goal set by California. Selection pressure will then be clear, consistent over time
and thus effective.
Diversity increases through innovation. Innovation in evolutionary policy-making can be
reinforced by increasing the chance of realising creative combinations, by stimulating
attractive future perspectives, and by supplying capital and facilitation, through a level of
niche management (i.e. increased isolation) and by increasing insight and knowledge. The
concept of serendipity could become operational through the creation of innovative networks,
with a focus on cross-fertilisation and stimulation. Such cross-fertilisation from different
institutional systems may also lead to fruitful co-evolution. An example is applying our
experience from natural gas systems to set up distribution systems in the hydrogen economy.
Isolated experiments and initiatives, on the other hand, may yield unique and surprising
technological pathways outside the dominant regime. Such initiatives may be useful in small-
scale incubator settings, where experiments are fostered as possible contributors for future
solutions.
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It is crucial for evolutionary policy-makers to balance between diversity and selection, so
as to prevent a system ending up in either deadlock or inefficiency. Here, it is important
to balance the cost of diversity in the short term against the benefits of diversity in the
longer term. This trade-off can never be made on the basis of full information, but relies
on expert estimation of chances, barriers and opportunities. On a larger scale (e.g. Europe
as compared to any one of its countries), it may be easier to balance between diversity and
efficiency, since relatively minor technologies may also reach a minimal scale advantage at
this level. With this insight, policy-makers should be invited to align trajectories for
sustainable development in large-scale co-operation, such as in the EU Framework
programmes.
It is important to note that evolutionary theory does not offer an ‘optimal policy’.
Bounded rationality prevents economic agents from optimising their economic behaviour.
An implication for evolutionary theory is that pricing instruments will not even realise
efficiency at the level of individual agents. The efficiency—and effectiveness—of
such instruments is therefore overestimated in traditional economic analysis and policy-
making.
Box. Evolutionary assessment of energy saving.
The notions of lock-in and environmental policy may be illustrated by experiences from
energy-saving policy. Energy-saving strategies often imply an increased efficiency of the
use of fossil fuels. There are two different types of energy-saving strategies: (1)
decreasing the demand for useful energy (e.g. insulating homes or decreasing the air
resistance of cars) and (2) increasing the efficiency of converting fossil fuels into useful
energy. A decreased demand for useful energy will not alter the economic advantage of
one fuel over the other. An increased conversion efficiency of fossil fuels, however, will
decrease the costs per unit of useful energy based on fossil fuel, and thereby strengthen
the economic advantage and lock-in of these fuels. Consequently, the increased
conversion efficiency of fossil fuels could hamper the transition towards an energy
system based on more sustainable energy resources. This point is illustrated in Figure 1.
The solid line shows CO2 emissions due to a large-scale transition to sustainable
energy production, while the broken line shows CO2 emission in an energy-savings
scenario. Cumulative emissions in the transition scenario are aþ b. Cumulative
emissions in the energy-saving scenario are aþ c. The most attractive scenario (in terms
of reductions) depends on whether b4 c or b5 c. Now, if time before the point of
transition increases, b increases compared to c, thus making energy savings more
attractive. On the other hand, since the saving of energy is progressing well (especially in
the initial stages of this scenario), policies for rendering a transition may become less
interesting. Energy-saving may hamper the sense of urgency that is often considered
necessary for a transition to sustainable energy production.
This point pits a theoretical argument against energy-saving policies. In practice,
however, it is conceivable to elaborate a more diverse and sophisticated policy strategy,
aimed at a sustainability transition in the longer term, but to maintain energy-saving
policies in the shorter term. This may not be the most cost-effective approach, but it
does line up with the theoretical perspectives from the evolutionary economic theory
and thus yields a more diverse and robust economy.
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4. Assessment of Dutch energy innovation policy from an evolutionary perspective
4.1. Design of the Dutch energy innovation policy
Dutch policies concerning the stimulation of energy innovations are embedded in several
policy fields with different co-ordinating ministerial departments. The Ministry of Economic
Affairs is responsible for energy policy and innovation policy. Climate policy, transition policy
and the stimulation of environmentally sound technologies are co-ordinated by the
Department of the Environment within the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment. Consequently, recent policies on the stimulation of energy innovation are
based on many different memoranda and reports formulated by different ministries and
advisory bodies. The evolutionary economic assessment of energy innovation policy in The
Netherlands is based on an analysis of the objectives and mechanisms identified in these
reports. In the present paper we will only refer to the dominant reports for current policies:
‘Energy Research Strategy’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2001) and ‘Action for Innovation’
(Ministry of Economic Affairs 2004a).
Policies to stimulate energy innovations relate to the overall objectives of energy policy,
which are largely inspired by the Kyoto Protocol objectives. The Dutch CO2 emission-
reduction goals are translated into objectives to stimulate energy savings and the use of
sustainable (‘green’) energy resources. An important point of departure for the Energy
Research Strategy is the changing position of the government: ‘‘The government’s role is
shifting from a player in the field to a conductor. The character of policy instruments is also
changing: demand is influenced by instruments such as norms, standards and fiscal
investment incentives. Furthermore, a more generic approach is more consistent with
contemporary thinking. New approaches, such as the use of technology roadmaps, have
become established. The focus of existing instruments is shifting, for example, towards
dissemination of knowledge and issues such as public acceptance’’ (Ministry of Economic
Affairs 2001).
Figure 1. CO2 emissions under a ‘sustainable energy’ scenario (solid line) and under an ‘energy saving’ scenario
(dashed line).
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‘Action for innovation’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2004a) elaborates the policy focus for
improving a sustainable economic growth through innovation. It presents the plans by the
Dutch government to ‘tackle the Lisbon ambition’. This ambition was formulated at the
European Council in Lisbon (2000) where the member states agreed that the European
Union should develop into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world within ten years.2 ‘Action for innovation’ was preceded by a number of reports and
memoranda which agreed on the perceived problems: (1) the Dutch innovation climate is not
attractive enough; (2) this climate lacks innovative companies; and (3) research lacks
sufficient focus and quantity. Current Dutch innovation policy is based on the concept of a
dynamic innovation system: the connection between the development, application and
introduction of innovations to the market. It focuses on improving the weak spots in the
system: the knowledge infrastructure and the introduction of innovations on the market.
Current innovation policy proposes the development of generic instruments to deal with these
problems. Specific attention is also paid to focusing on the economic sectors that are
frontrunners, so as to make full use of the advantages of the cutting-edge industries (Ministry
of Economic Affairs 2004a). Thus the Dutch innovation policy has two main goals: to
improve the focus on the strengths of the innovation system and to increase the mass of the
innovation system as a whole.
4.2. Evolutionary assessment of Dutch energy innovation policy
The identified evolutionary economic concepts of diversity, innovation, selection, bounded
rationality, path dependency (and lock-in), and co-evolution can be used for a policy
assessment, as seen in our analysis of a number of key documents of Dutch energy innovation
policy.3
Although the point of departure of current Dutch innovation policies is a systems approach,
which is in line with evolutionary economic thinking, the practical implementation of these
policies still focuses on traditional policy instruments, such as subsidies, fiscal measures and
negotiated agreements.4 Only very recently an increase comes forth in focus on and tentative
application of system instruments, such as innovation networks and thematic innovation
programmes. Specifically, thematic public – private partnerships in R&D based at the large
Dutch technological institutes are generally conceived to be very well organised (OECD
2003).
Many of the central evolutionary concepts can be traced in energy innovation policy,
although practical application is, in many instances, limited. For example, strategic
documents signal the importance of diversity and diversity management, but this manage-
ment is more applicable to technologies than strategies, sectors or companies. A central point
in innovation policy is the dilemma between focus and momentum, on the one hand, and
diversity, on the other. This is much in line with the theoretical dilemma introduced in the
previous section.
The elaboration of evolutionary principles behind the concept of innovation shows a
somewhat mixed assessment. Much attention is paid to interaction and technology transfer,
which is often regarded as one of the main shortcomings in the Dutch innovation
system. On the other hand, elements like cross-fertilisation, serendipity, isolation and niche
markets do not receive any attention in energy innovation policy. Increase in the fundamental
body of knowledge is largely dependent on training and education, both of which receive
considerable attention in policy issues. Niche markets are not present as a strategic tool, but
some experiments on innovative, sustainable energy alternatives are stimulated through
subsidies or other instruments. Finally, we discern a large focus on technologies, or
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rather, organisational or institutional innovations, which may be just as important for goals of
productivity.
The evolutionary concept of selection environment is lacking. In Dutch energy innovation
policy the market is implicitly considered to be the dominant selection factor, to which
government should maintain a sound distance so as not to disturb the mechanisms of the free
market. Relatively much attention is reserved for the removal of innovation barriers. Much
policy is focused on the inclusion of external costs, which should, to a large extent, be
sufficient for making market mechanisms work properly. ‘‘A new selection mechanism for
innovations in the free market can thus be applied; government does not need to interfere, as
the winners will come forward automatically’’ (Ministry of Economic Affairs 2004b).
With regard to the concept of bounded rationality,much attention is given to the elements of
time horizon and imitation. A limited time horizon can be associated with many private
entrepreneurs. Government itself often applies more distant time horizons, for example, by
making use of scenario studies and strategic planning tools. On the other hand, a level of
routine can often be distinguished in the application of traditional policy instruments focused
on direct economic incentives, such as subsidies and taxes. Imitation increasingly plays a role
in the framing of innovation policies, especially for SMEs following frontrunning enterprises.
The concepts of path dependency and lock-in have found their way in strategic policy,
including the concept of the level playing field. Elaboration of the strategic concepts into
operational policy instruments seems to be turned toward prevention of barriers, rather than
stimulation of driving forces. The prevention of lock-in—which is very clearly incorporated in
policy—is thus mainly framed in postponing selection, rather than full-hearted support for
flexible solutions. A discussion on more strategic choices for the prevention of lock-in may be
useful in energy policy, for example, in large-scale versus small-scale energy production. The
dense energy network in The Netherlands is only tentatively mentioned, supporting a policy
choice for large-scale and centralised options rather than small-scale solutions. Finally, the
element of level playing field is very often mentioned, but usually in the context of competitive
relations with other countries with a much more limited meaning than proposed in the
previous section. Different positions on the learning curve are not recognised as an important
point of attention. Transition management would require a stronger focus on the
development of sustainable energy technologies through early investments and learning-by-
doing. The concept of level playing field is not usually regarded in its extended version, i.e.
where alternative technologies, organisations and institutions can compete with more
dominant elements.
Finally, the concept of co-evolution is not generally used as an important element in Dutch
innovation policies. Although different memoranda on the subject of energy innovation note
the importance of developments in non-energy-related technologies, there is hardly any
connection between energy policy and innovation policy. Co-evolution is, moreover, seen as
an advantageous or unpleasant coincidence but not as something policy could consciously try
to make use of. An example of potential co-evolution based on complementarity is hydrogen
transport in a hypothetical hydrogen economy that would make use of gas pipelines already in
place.
From this assessment, we may conclude that the evolutionary economic concepts adopted
in Dutch energy innovation policy are in accordance with traditional notions of efficiency and
effectiveness: diversity of technologies, co-operation in public – private partnerships, applica-
tion of future visions for roadmapping, market as a selective mechanism, several elements of
bounded rationality and the consciousness of scale advantages. The concepts that are applied
most thus satisfy both evolutionary and traditional perspectives. Practical elaboration of policy
strategies usually still relies on traditional command-and-control and some market
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instruments, which do not necessarily collide with the evolutionary perspective. However, we
can see a tendency towards the application of system instruments, which align well with
evolutionary policy-making.
5. Evolutionary assessment of three specific energy technologies
5.1. Fuel cells
Fuel cells are clean and efficient energy transformation appliances, which convert a fuel
(usually hydrogen) into electricity (and heat). In general discussions, fuel cells are often
related to the ‘hydrogen economy’. In this concept, hydrogen is the central energy carrier and
fuel cells are an important element of the system. In fuel cell technology we can find a high
level of diversity in techniques, applications and companies involved. With regard to the
innovation aspects, fuel cells can be considered a radical innovation, characterised by strong
interactions between different industries (inter alia the chemical industry, energy companies
and car manufacturers). Niche markets can be found in aeronautics and (‘zero emission’)
motor vehicles. Liberalisation of energy markets (provided that there is a level playing field)
and stringent environmental policy might be conducive to creating a favourable selection
environment for fuel cells.5 Bounded rationality could hamper the introduction of fuel cells,
as it requires a clean break with existing routines and long-term, risky investments.
Nevertheless, if one sheep leaps over the ditch, the rest will follow (we can already observe this
imitative behaviour among car manufacturers, many of whom are now working on fuel-cell
cars). Path dependency and lock-in in existing technologies (such as the internal combustion
engine and batteries) imply an important barrier for fuel cells. On the other hand, economies
of scale in the application of fuel cells are limited, which means that they would fit very well
into small-scale, decentralised energy systems. In terms of co-evolution, a strong
interdependence between fuel cells and other components of the energy system can be
noted (such as the fuel supply infrastructure).
The Dutch as well as the larger European fuel-cell arena is still very much focused on the
R&D phase, since large-scale commercial application is still beyond the horizon. Many
technical and economic barriers remain to be overcome. However, small niche markets are
already in place, often in hybrid applications. Increasing demand for fuel cells may now be at
the turning point of opportunity: further new applications will be increasingly important, so as
to allow the technology to move forward on the learning curve. Government may play a role
here, both as legislator and large customer.
5.2. Nuclear fusion
The path of nuclear fusion to commercial application has long been said to be about 50 years
and remains so to date. Much research is still very fundamental and projects on application
are very much focused on experimenting with fundamental principles. The high costs
involved and the still-distant benefits largely exclude private partners from the research. The
very centralised energy technology only allows for very large-scale units. Present-day
experimental units are thus very expensive. Even though commercial application may still be
beyond the horizon, the learning curve is rather steep, even when compared to the well-known
Moore’s Law for the evolution of computer processors (Figure 2).
The high costs involved in nuclear fusion allow for only one type of fusion technology, that
based on Tokomak installations. A second important element is the high level of co-
operation, illustrated by the continuous interaction between the United States and the former
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Soviet Union even during the Cold War period. Finally, the vision of the future is very utopian
in attractiveness: large-scale application of nuclear fusion requires a cheap, unlimited and
widely availabe fuel (water) and causes hardly any environmentally harmful emissions.
Assessing nuclear fusion for the six evolutionary economic aspects that we have
distinguished, it is obvious that the degree of diversity in this technology is very low. The
main observation concerning the factors relating to innovation, is that there is a lot of
(worldwide) co-operation within a relatively small network of experts, whose interactions with
other sectors are limited. There are, as yet, no (niche) markets for the technology, the viability
of which will be strongly dependent on a favourable selection environment, in which stringent
CO2 policies will have to play an important role. With respect to bounded rationality, it can be
said that there is a lack of interest among private investors (due to the long time horizon
involved) and an absence of established routines on which to base the technology’s
application. With respect to path dependency and lock-in, the huge investments in fusion
technology would clearly seem to have an irreversible character and economies of scale are
extremely important. This implies that nuclear fusion will fit in well to the existing large scale
electricity supply regime, but it is incompatible with a decentralised energy supply system.
Regarding co-evolution, there is very little exchange to be noted with other areas of energy
technology, but some complementarity between areas of expertise relevant for nuclear fusion
can be observed (e.g. plasma physics and materials science).
5.3. Photovoltaic cells (PV)
Photovoltaic (PV) or solar cells are seen in sharp contrast to nuclear fusion in the sense that
the former type of energy conversion is conceptually very de-centralised. The silicon-based
Figure 2. Relative performance of fusion experiments and other hi-tech developments over the last 30 years.
Explanation: Since the early Russian T3 tokamak, the performance of fusion plasmas has doubled every 1.8 years
(circles). The performance of fusion plasmas is defined in terms of the triple product (density6temperature6time).
The progress in this triple product compares favourably with the doubling of the energy of particle accelerators every 3
years (triangles), and the doubling of the number of transistors on a chip every 2 years (‘Moore’s law’; squares). The
dashed line at the top shows the performance expected with the planned ITER fusion reactor (Source: Hoang and
Jacquinot 2004).
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PV cell was discovered more or less by accident in the electronics industry, making it a good
example of serendipity. The concept of applying thin film PV cells originated in photography,
providing a good example of cross-fertilisation. Niche markets for PV applications, first
developed in aerospace technology, were later extended to off-grid applications such as
marine light beacons. PV applications may be grid-coupled, although there is no fundamental
need to do so. Scale advantages in application are very limited. Many off-grid applications in
remote areas, for example, are conceivable or already in place. Investment costs are, however,
still very high, even though the learning curve is quite steep, largely due to learning-by-doing
experiences. Large-scale application opportunities in The Netherlands are seen as being
limited, since the Dutch electricity network is very dense, therefore not allowing for many off-
grid niche markets. Large-scale application in other parts of the world will certainly require a
break in the technological regime, as the PV production units can be applied in a much more
decentralised context than present power production units.
In addressing PV in terms of the six evolutionary-economic aspects, we can make the
following observations. Diversity is high in several respects: companies dealing with PV-
technology display a large variety (both in size and type of industry); a number of different
technologies are in existence, in addition to the ‘traditional’ monocrystalline silicon cells, and
there is a wide range of (potential) areas of application. With respect to innovation, we saw
that serendipity, cross-fertilisation and niche markets have played an important role in the
development of PV. On the other hand, the lack of an authoritative, coherent future
perspective on the role of PV may have been a restraining factor.6 In the selection
environment for PV, government policies form an essential factor. PV is still an expensive
technology and will remain dependent on subsidies and other preferential policy measures for
quite some time. Among the elements of bounded rationality, it is the short time horizons of
private investors that stand out. PV is capital-intensive, with a long lifetime and low
operational costs. Its financial performance is therefore highly dependent on the discount rate
or payback period applied by the investor. In terms of path-dependency and lock-in, we can
mention that PV can hardly benefit from economies of scale in application. It is therefore
particularly suitable for systems of decentralised electricity supply. Finally, with respect to co-
evolution, a relevant feature of PV is its intermittent character (due to the fluctuations in solar
energy influx). This implies that application of PV application will have implications for other
components of the energy system (such as energy storage devices).
6. Conclusions
Evolutionary economics offers clear insights into the mechanisms that underlie innovations,
structural changes and system transitions, therefore making it highly valuable for the framing
of policies aimed at fostering environmental innovations and a transition to sustainable
development. On the basis of major literature sources in this field, we have drawn up a list of
core concepts which can be helpful in putting the evolutionary economic theory into policy
practice. The central evolutionary concepts include ‘diversity’, ‘innovation’, ‘selection
environment’, ‘bounded rationality’, ‘path dependency and lock-in’, and ‘co-evolution’.
We have presented an evolutionary economics assessment of current Dutch policies on
energy innovations, showing that some evolutionary economic notions have found their way
into the policy discourse. Nevertheless, when it comes to concrete actions, only those aspects
of evolutionary economic theory that do not conflict with notions of efficiency are put into
practise. Current policies concentrate on cooperation, education, future perspectives and
demonstration projects. Evolutionary aspects such as innovative combinations, cross-
fertilisation and serendipity, however, are not stimulated and sometimes even hampered by
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current policies. Moreover, the idea of an extended level playing field receives hardly any
attention.
The case studies of three specific energy technologies—fuel cells, nuclear fusion and
photovoltaic cells (PV)—show how useful evolutionary economic notions are in understanding
the development of new technologies. The development of fuel cells has been stimulated by a
high degree of diversity of economic agents, techniques and products, by the cooperation
between different parties, and by the niche market (e.g. for zero-emission cars). The case of
nuclear fusion shows the importance of having an appealing perspective of a clean and
inexhaustible energy source. However, in spite of this positive future perspective, it is
not enough to overcome the bounded rationality (short time horizon) of private investors. Pho-
tovoltaic cell technology, on the other hand, has developed well in The Netherlands despite the
drawback of a pessimistic future perspective. This case study showed both the important role of
serendipity and cross-fertilisation, and of niche markets, for the development of this technology.
Our study does not offer instant policy solutions such as in terms of specific levels of
diversity required. Nevertheless, this paper has shown that many useful policy lessons can be
learned. Although a central concept of evolutionary processes is the inherent absence of a
purpose or goal, this does not mean that it is impossible to influence these processes. Since it
is impossible to predict which technologies will be the ‘greenest’ or ‘best’ in any other way,
policy-makers should refrain from ‘picking winners’. Instead, policy aimed at stimulating the
development of sustainable technologies should emphasise the creation of conditions under
which only the greenest technologies will survive.
Notes
1. In addition, it is good to notice that in-group diversity is relevant to co-evolution. History
shows that human societies perform better—in terms of economic productivity—when a
variety of complementary types of behaviour, such as selfish behaviour, cooperative
behaviour, and altruistic punishment, is present. This is consistent with the notions of
specialisation and labour division that are at the core of market liberalisation and free-trade
thinking in economics in general and international trade theory in particular.
2. See Presidency Conclusions of the Lisbon European Council (2000): http://ue.eu.int/
ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm
3. A list of these documents (all of them in Dutch) is available from the authors upon request.
4. Although negotiated agreements (also called voluntary agreements or covenants) are not
common in all countries, they have flourished in The Netherlands since the 1980s. These
are agreements between government and private parties for reaching targets on the
reduction of environmental pressure. They often act as an alternative to direct regulation.
Negotiated agreements are based on trust between the parties involved, but have no
foundation in public law. Part of the arrangement is usually that legislative measures are
either not imposed or imposed at a later stage (Hofman and Schrama 2003).
5. With regard to the impact of energy market liberalisation on the transition to sustainable
energy opinions seem to diverge. Some believe that liberalisation of energy and electricity
markets will hamper such a transition because firms will be focusing on short-term
competition and profits, as well as strategic innovations with short payback periods. Others
feel that market liberalisation will lead to more diversity in characteristics like size,
technology and strategy of firms, which in turn will contribute to an unlocking of outdated
technologies as well as stimulate innovations in general. Given the short and imperfect
history of liberalisation of energy markets it is still too early to arrive at a definite judgement
on this issue.
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6. To some extent, the publication in September 2004 by the European Commission of
‘A Vision for Photovoltaic Technology for 2030 and Beyond’ may have filled this gap.
See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/energy/photovoltaics/introduction_en.html
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